The petitioning affiliate pays the USCIS petition and related fees listed on Form G-1055; the client pays the affiliate under the services contract; the analyst is paid by the affiliate, not the client.
Let the money flow prove the control structure
The direction in which money moves is itself evidence on the labour-for-hire question. The utility pays the affiliate a contract price for a deliverable; the affiliate pays the analyst a salary and benefits; the affiliate pays the government fees for the L-1 petition, including the base I-129 fee, the fraud-prevention fee, any asylum-program fee and optional premium processing, at the amounts on the current fee schedule. If the client were paying the analyst an hourly rate through the affiliate as a pass-through, the arrangement would look like staffing. Beyond government charges, budget for professional fees, translations of French records, and the cost of the affiliate’s project manager spending real time supervising the placement, which is both a compliance requirement and a cost the contract price should cover.
A cost review should preserve the commercial logic of the assignment. The petitioner normally pays the worker and invoices the client for a defined service; records should not suggest that the client has simply purchased the worker's labour. Budget government fees, legal work, relocation, and the continuing cost of maintaining the specialized program. Hypothetical example: an industrial-automation company places a controls specialist at a paper mill. A fixed-price implementation contract, internal timesheets, and supervision by the company's project lead support the distinction between a deliverable and labour-for-hire.